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Playing with Fire: An Assessment of the EU’s Approach of
Constructive Ambiguity on Kosovo’s Blended Conﬂict
Argyro Kartsonaki
Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
ABSTRACT
This article introduces ‘blended conﬂict’ as a novel approach for the
understanding of the multi-levelled interconnectedness of factors
that lead to, and sustain, complex conﬂicts. It assesses the impact of
the European Union’s eﬀorts to manage Kosovo’s blended conﬂict,
focusing on the EU-facilitated dialogue and the establishment of
the Association/Community of Serb Majority Municipalities. It
shows that the EU’s tactic of constructive ambiguity has produced
short-term results at the state level, but it endangers stability in the
long term by exacerbating the situation on the ground. Empirically
the study draws on data from repeated ﬁeldtrips and semi-
structured interviews with EU personnel, governmental, non-
governmental and international actors in Kosovo and Serbia. This
article contributes theoretically and empirically to the wider conﬂict
management literature.
Introduction
Kosovo is a complex conﬂict that has developed into a complex security issue on
European territory. It is not a violent conﬂict any more, but it is also not one that has
been sustainably resolved either. Kosovo remains a contested state. Ten years after it
unilaterally declared independence from Serbia, it has been recognized by 1141 United
Nations member states including three permanent United Nations Security Council
members and 23 European Union (EU) countries. Serbia, however, remains adamant
in non-recognition and is being supported by the other two permanent members of the
Security Council, Russia and China. Five EU countries, Greece, Cyprus, Slovakia,
Romania and Spain also refuse to recognize Kosovo as an independent state.
The Yugoslav wars were an example of a blended conﬂict, a violent conﬂict
characterized by internal fragmentation and intense internationalization. It had var-
ious simultaneous fronts at diﬀerent levels of analysis. It took place in the aftermath of
the Cold War at a time of a global regime change that included the collapse of the
Eastern bloc, the emergence of the US as undisputed global hegemon, the re-
uniﬁcation of Germany and its re-establishment as a European leading power, and
the birth of the EU as a collective European actor. The Western Balkans, especially
Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the recently renamed North Macedonia, have been
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since the end of the Yugoslav wars in a transition phase. This constant transition phase
and the weariness it brings about to the local population has contributed to the
Balkans becoming a place of latent and simmering blended conﬂicts.
The EU agenda towards the Balkans remains consistent throughout the years with
security and stability as its priority. In the case of Kosovo, this is a factor that ameliorates
volatility by providing a common goal to conﬂict parties, which is none other than
European integration. The ulterior motive of EU accession has oﬀered a platform for all
parties—Pristina, Belgrade and Brussels—to negotiate. With the carrot of integration, the
EU has the stick of reform on Kosovo’s domestic politics. As chapter 35 of Serbia’s
accession process concerns the normalization of relations with Kosovo, the EU also puts
Serbia under pressure to resolve the conﬂict.
This article appraises the EU’s eﬀorts to resolve the conﬂict in Kosovo through the EU-
facilitated dialogue focusing in particular on the provisions for the creation of the
Association/Community of Serb Majority Municipalities (hereafter Association). It
explains through the prism of blended conﬂicts why the EU’s approach of ‘constructive
ambiguity’ failed to produce the expected results. Constructive ambiguity has provided
room for the conduct of negotiations and for agreements to be signed. It has also created
room, though, for these agreements to be interpreted in diverse ways leading to stalemates
and crises, instead of implementation. This research shows that the EU under-appreciates
the depth of the conﬂict and continues with superﬁcial, box-ticking measures. These
provide the legal and political framework for further discussions at state, regional and
international level. However, they are disconnected from the local level and the needs of the
local population. The use, hence, of constructive ambiguity in a blended conﬂict may
produce initial results at the state level, but endangers stability in the long term by
aggravating the situation on the ground.
This article makes a theoretical and an empirical contribution. Theoretically, it
introduces the concept of blended conﬂicts, proposing a novel and a more holistic
approach to describe complex conﬂicts, either ongoing (such as the conﬂicts in the
Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, the Sahel, and Ukraine) or latent (for instance, in
Central Asia and the Balkans). The conceptualization of blended conﬂicts will lead to
a better understanding of complex conﬂicts, having broader implications for conﬂict
management and conﬂict prevention strategies. Empirically the research brings to light
original evidence regarding the local situation in Kosovo and the impact of the EU
policies. It draws on data from semi-structured interviews conducted in Kosovo2 and
Serbia since the signing of the Brussels Agreement in April 2013. The ﬁeld research was
carried out over three rounds: in Kosovo (Pristina, Gračanica, North Mitrovica),
June 2014; in Serbia (Belgrade), March 2015; and again in Kosovo (Pristina, Gračanica,
North Mitrovica), December 2017. The time gap between the ﬁeldtrips allowed the
observation of potential changes in perceptions of the participants regarding the creation
of the Association and the attitude towards international involvement in Kosovo.
Interviewees comprised oﬃcials working in the European Union Rule of Law Mission
in Kosovo (EULEX), EU diplomats, non-EU diplomats, senior UN oﬃcials, retired
governmental oﬃcials (Serbia, Kosovo, EU member states), civil society activists, NGO
representatives, journalists and press editors. The research also drew on EU, Kosovan3
and Serbian policy reports, as well as civil society reports.
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The article is structured as follows. First, it explains the concept of blended conﬂicts.
Then, it shows why Kosovo is characterized as such. Afterwards, the article demonstrates
the role of the EU in this conﬂict. It explains what the Association was supposed to be,
and shows how it not only failed to produce the expected results, but also inﬂamed
certain aspects of the conﬂict further entrenching Kosovo’s stalemate. The article con-
cludes with an overall evaluation of the EU’s approach of constructive ambiguity in
Kosovo.
Deﬁning blended conﬂict
The concept of blended conﬂict describes violent conﬂicts, exhibiting internal fragmen-
tation and intense internationalization4. They take place in penetrated regional systems
and have various simultaneous fronts at diﬀerent levels of analysis. They combine
elements of intrastate and interstate conﬂicts. Identity grievances, horizontal inequalities,
but also internal divisions of the population within the same ethnic group based, for
example, on sect, tribe or political aﬃliation, are characteristics encountered in blended
conﬂicts. Furthermore, disputes over border delineation, often combined with issues
over access to resources, have a prominent role in blended conﬂicts. Resources are of
salient importance not only for the parties directly involved in conﬂict but also for third-
party states and private companies, trying to secure access to resources and control of the
transport routes. Taking place in weak political regimes or during political transitions,
blended conﬂicts become the theatre of wider geopolitical agendas of great powers
competing over control of the aﬀected regions.
The concept of blended conﬂicts oﬀers a more holistic understanding of the dynamics
of complex conﬂicts. Existing literature often focuses on one central factor that may lead
to violence if combined with other conditions. For example, studies have shown the
impact of identity on the outbreak of conﬂict when combined political exclusion,5
political grievances stemming from status loss,6 weak state structures and lack of demo-
cratic culture.7 Attention has also been given to identity diﬀerentiation when combined
with economic grievances,8 poverty,9 corruption10 and severe group inequalities in
economic, social, political or cultural terms.11 Other scholars focus more on how elites
use power-vacuums, weak institutions and economic decline in order to ‘ethnicize’
territory and fuel violence by creating perceptions of identity that did not exist
before.12 Geography has also been researched as a factor enabling conﬂict, examining
how access to,13 and/or competition over, resources,14 food and water15 may lead to war.
Greed and opportunity stemming from natural resources have also been researched as
causes of conﬂict.16 Emphasizing the role of regional factors in a conﬂict, Buzan and
Waever developed regional security complex theory17 providing an analytical framework
that examines regional systems and subsystems deﬁned in terms of security and relations
of amity and enmity between the actors of each region. Similarly, the role of neighbour-
hood has been studied,18 emphasizing the processes of diﬀusion and contagion19 and the
regional dimensions of state failure.20 Finally, scholars have shown how external inter-
ventions and global changes inﬂuence the outbreak of conﬂicts. Fouskas and Gökay
demonstrated how the end of the Cold War and the following US hegemony allowed for
interventions aiming to secure the energy resources of Eurasia and ensure control over oil
and gas transport routes from the Caspian Sea and the Middle East to the West and the
JOURNAL OF BALKAN AND NEAR EASTERN STUDIES 105
Southeast Asia.21 Woodward and Glaurdić examining the Yugoslav wars demonstrated
how the end of the Cold War had an eﬀect on the outbreak of conﬂict,22 while Ayoob,
and Ehteshami and Hinnebusch demonstrated how global developments aﬀected foreign
policy and security in the Middle East.23
The above literature provides valuable knowledge on the impact of certain factors on
the outbreak of intrastate conﬂicts. This is both a merit and a drawback of existing
studies. It is a merit as through thorough research on one central cause of conﬂict, the
understanding of the impact of this particular factor is enhanced. Treating causes of
conﬂict in isolation, however, leads to only partial understanding of what leads to, and
sustains, complex, protracted conﬂicts. What is missing, therefore, and what the concept
of blended conﬂicts adds to the literature, is a framework that combines and examines the
interconnectedness of internal, regional and global causes of conﬂict in a multi-level
approach.
Blended conﬂicts are diﬀerent from other types of conﬂict because of their volatility
and their multi-dimensional complexity. Blended conﬂict refers to violent conﬂicts,
taking place in weak political regimes or regimes in transition. Blended conﬂicts have
several simultaneous violent fronts (for example, the Yugoslav wars or the current wars
in Syria and Iraq). They exhibit extreme levels of internal fragmentation even among
groups that seem to constitute a coherent entity (the Kurds, for example). They involve
separatist demands and a disputed territory within those demands (North Mitrovica in
Kosovo, the Abyei Area in Sudan, the Disputed Territories in Iraq). These territories are
either resource rich or on the transit route of energy supply (the Balkans, the Caspian Sea,
the Middle East). Finally, they demonstrate intense internationalization with state and
non-state actors being directly involved both for conﬂict management and for conﬂict
prolongation purposes (for instance, the EU, Russia and the US in the Balkans; Russia,
the US, Iran, Turkey, and oil and gas companies in Syria and Iraq).
There are several blended conﬂicts around the world. Developments over the last years
in Iraq oﬀer a prime example of a blended conﬂict. It is a complex conﬂict that
incorporates several sub-conﬂicts among diﬀerent actors and at diﬀerent levels of
analysis. It is a deep-rooted sectarian conﬂict among Sunnis and Shi’as and an ethnic
conﬂict primarily between Arabs and Kurds, but also other ethnic groups as well, such as
Turkmens.24 It was, until the defeat of the Islamic State in 2017, a conﬂict between three
de facto states: the Kurdistan Region, the Islamic State and the Baghdad-Basra region
controlled by the government of Iraq.25 It is also a civil conﬂict between Kurds them-
selves produced and sustained through the division between the dominant political
parties (Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan), their respec-
tive armies and their international supporters. These elements of conﬂict are exacerbated
by population displacement and demographic changes. In addition, it is a territorial
conﬂict between Baghdad and Erbil over the disputed territories including Kirkuk,
a place of symbolic importance for Turkmens and Kurds and of economic importance
for all parties concerned.26 Regional powers, Turkey and Iran as well as regional Kurdish
actors interfere providing both oﬃcial and unoﬃcial support to conﬂict parties. Finally,
the Middle East has turned again into Cold War-like theatre of proxy wars between
a declining US and a re-emerging Russia, reclaiming its share of inﬂuence in the region.
Similar conﬂicts are to be found elsewhere in the Middle East, including the
Palestinian-Israeli conﬂict and the ongoing Syrian war. Beyond the Middle East, the
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conﬂict in South Sudan and the still unresolved issue of the Abyei Area with Sudan
provide other examples of ongoing blended conﬂicts. Blended conﬂicts, however, can
also be latent. The multi-ethnic composition of the Ferghana Valley and the mounting
polarization between the various ethnic groups, the unresolved border disputes between
Central Asian states, the conﬂict over energy and water, and national and international
antagonism over natural resources have created fertile ground for a potential outbreak of
a blended conﬂict in Central Asia.27
Kosovo is a latent blended conﬂict on European soil. It is part of the aftermath of
another blended conﬂict, the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s; a war that in its conclusion
ended with the creation of another two latent blended conﬂicts in the Balkans, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and North Macedonia. In case of violence, the transnational kin found in
those states divided by the artiﬁcial borders inherited from the Balkan Wars and the
former Yugoslavia would make its spill-over highly likely. The geostrategic location of the
Balkans attracted external interest throughout the twentieth century.28 After the collapse
of communism, Kosovo became the stage of NATO’s transformation from a defensive
alliance to a global security actor, initiating the project of US eastward expansion and
ensuring US control over energy routes from the Caspian Sea to the West.29 In the last
years, the EU has taken the lead seeking, with the incentive of EU integration, to ensure
stability in the region and protect Western geopolitical interests.30 This article explains in
detail Kosovo’s blended conﬂict and evaluates the EU’s strategies to resolve it.
Kosovo’s blended conﬂict
Kosovo exhibits characteristics of a blended conﬂict. It has suﬀered identity grievances,
horizontal inequalities and grievances over status loss. Its population is divided, not only
along ethnic lines, but also internally within ethnic groups. It is itself a contested state,
with weak state institutions, incorporating a disputed territory in the north of Kosovo.
Kosovo, and its disputed territory, in particular, are resource rich and the whole of
Kosovo lies extremely close to the Balkan transport route for energy. Ethnic kin is to be
found in the other Western Balkans countries, also plagued by unresolved similar issues,
endangering stability in the region in case of violence. Third-party intervention and
internationalization is particularly intense in Kosovo, with the EU, US and Russia
pursuing their own agendas.
Kosovo has been characterized by a cycle of domination and suppression between
Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians that has shifted hands for centuries.31 This con-
tributed to the development of a history of victimization and trauma in both commu-
nities that led to identity grievances, exacerbated in times of change.32 A time of change
was the process of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. In this process, Kosovo was chal-
lenged not only by identity grievances, but also grievances over status loss, poor economy
and political and social marginalization, with the Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević
depriving Kosovo of the elevated status it enjoyed in the federal state, ﬁring ethnic
Albanians from state enterprises, and replacing them with Serbs and Montenegrins.33
Grievances and horizontal inequalities have continued to take place in post-1999 Kosovo.
However, they reversed and targeted Kosovo Serbs. Kosovo Serbs now live in margin-
alized enclaves, economically excluded and socially and politically intimidated.34
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Therefore, Kosovo has been plagued by past and ongoing identity grievances, poverty
and horizontal inequalities that perpetuate the conﬂict.
Weak state institutions have exacerbated the conﬂict in Kosovo. Kosovo, despite its
elevated status, was not a Yugoslav Republic,35 and in 1989 Milošević revoked its
autonomy. Then, Kosovo was mainly run by Serbs and Montenegrins for 10 years, before
being placed under UN administration in 1999.36 This series of events resulted in Kosovo
not having the institutional memory and the technical knowledge of how to function as
a state after it declared independence.37 In spite of the eﬀorts of international actors on
the ground and the remarkable progress Kosovo has made thus far, its institutions
remain weak. This enables the inconsistent interpretation of laws, inadequate translation
of state documents, and inconsistent regulation memos that often lead to laws being
practically inapplicable.38 It also impedes the provision of social services of adequate
quality to its citizens, adding to the disappointment of Kosovo Albanians towards their
state and the marginalization of Kosovo Serbs. In addition, it has allowed Serbia to
maintain its parallel structures within Kosovo and legitimize them as the only structures
available to Kosovo Serbs.39
The Serb-dominated municipalities north of the Ibar River constitute a disputed
territory inside Kosovo. Until 2014, North Kosovo operated as a part of Serbia, with
education, health care and other public services provided by Serbia-run structures. This
has created a divide at various levels. First, Northern Kosovo as a disputed territory
within a disputed country, being out of Pristina’s control, further undermines Kosovo’s
sovereignty and statehood. Second, there is a divide between Kosovo Serbs living north
and south of Ibar. Serbs in the south are more aﬀected by Kosovo’s secession than Serbs
living in the north. They face day-to-day ethnically motivated harassment and discrimi-
nation and they would be more vulnerable in the case of an outbreak of violence as the
one that occurred in 2004.40 They oppose, therefore, statements and actions by Serb
politicians that might endanger their physical safety.41
In terms of natural resources, Kosovo sits on 10.9 billion tons of proven, exploitable
lignite reserves, i.e. more than 1,300 years of secure supply. The country has also
abundant deposits of ferronickel, lead, zinc, magnetite, and other ores that, if developed,
could make a major contribution to employment and exports.42 Although natural
resources played little role for the onset of conﬂict, they swiftly attracted local and
international attention.43 Currently, the Trepča mines44 are the apple of discord between
various state and private stakeholders and although production has been minimal since
the 1990s, none of the involved parties is willing to relinquish ownership. In 2016, the
government of Kosovo announced that it would take over the mines, an action Serbia
condemned.45 The ownership status is further complicated by the obscurity of the
privatization process Milošević initiated in 1997, after which Serbian and international
companies claimed shareholdings in Trepča. The situation perplexes more due to the fact
that Trepča Company owns signiﬁcant swaths of land in Northern Kosovo and property
that houses public buildings.46
However, it is not only the existence of natural resources in Kosovo that make its
geography important, but also Kosovo’s location on the transport route for oil and gas
from Central Asia to the West.47 This makes the Balkans and Kosovo, in particular,
a strategic energy bridge between East and West. The US rushed to secure dominance in
the region after the collapse of the Soviet Union, ensuring NATO’s eastward expansion
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and protection of US energy interests, seeking to diversify energy supply and break
Russia’s monopoly over oil and gas transport routes.48
Global factors, thus, played a salient role in the unfolding and outcome of Kosovo’s
conﬂict. Kosovo’s secession was enabled by power dynamics at the global level in the
1990s, when the power imbalance between the patrons of Serbia and Kosovo, Russia and
the US, respectively, determined a status quo that Russia could not reverse in the
following decade.49 Russia was neither able to exert suﬃcient inﬂuence during the
Vienna negotiations (2006–2007) nor was it able to prevent Kosovo’s unilateral declara-
tion of independence in 2008. However, the international scene has changed since 2008.
US supremacy has declined, whereas Russia has started to reclaim its position as a global
power.50 TheWest has not been able to achieve universal recognition for Kosovo through
lobbying and bilateral diplomacy without the recognition of Serbia or the support of
China and Russia.51 The latter have not only pledged to veto Kosovo’s entry into the UN
but they also support Serbia in its eﬀorts against Kosovo’s further international recogni-
tion, as was evidently demonstrated by Kosovo’s failure to join UNESCO in 2015.52
Furthermore, the conﬂict in Ukraine has strengthened Russia’s position in the
Balkans. By stating that trying to push Belgrade into signing up to Brussels-backed
sanctions against Russia would be to repeat the mistakes the EU made in pulling Kyiv
westwards,53 Russia warns the West of the potential destabilizing eﬀects overtly assertive
actions may have for regional stability. Serbia skilfully uses these power games and its
position as a traditional ally of Russia in the Western Balkans to its advantage. Carefully
balancing its stance towards the EU and Russia, Serbia has managed to maintain
a European course and a discrete cooperation with NATO, while oﬃcially rejecting
NATO membership.54 It refused, nonetheless, to align with Western sanctions against
Russia. It also vocally reaﬃrmed its loyalty to Russia, seeking not to estrange
a considerable portion of its population, who still sees Russia as Serbia’s closest ally.55
In return, Russia reaﬃrmed its stance of non-recognition of Kosovo. Kosovo has become,
therefore, once again a geopolitical battleﬁeld, where global antagonism determines
progress or stalemate.
Finally, the geographic location of Kosovo within the European continent has led to
sustained EU involvement seeking to prevent any destabilization. The disintegration of
Yugoslavia into its republics altered the regional dynamics, transforming the former
federal state into six independent states, plus Kosovo as a contested state. Considerations
of contagion and diﬀusion of the conﬂict are intensiﬁed by the existence of transnational
ethnic Albanian and Serbian kin throughout the former Yugoslav states and the existence
of unresolved similar conﬂicts across the Western Balkans, such as in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, North Macedonia, and, to a lesser extent, Montenegro. These concerns
over the potential destabilizing eﬀects prompted the EU to remain actively involved in
Kosovo, seeking to ensure regional security and stability.
The EU in Kosovo
The primary goal of the EU policies in the Balkans is the preservation of security and
stability.56 The EU has been providing resources and expertise for Kosovo’s institution
building and reconstruction,57 and since 2008, with the establishment of the European
Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, it has taken a more active role on the ground.
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EULEX provides expertise for the strengthening of rule of law, seeking to improve and
lustrate the judicial system, contribute to the ﬁght against corruption and organized
crime and adjudicate sensitive cases, such as high-proﬁle bribery, drug and human
traﬃcking, inter-ethnic crimes and war crimes. EULEX also supports the EU-facilitated
dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina by assisting with the implementation of agree-
ments in the sphere of rule of law.58
EULEX has demonstrated mixed results thus far, as it has contributed to conﬂict preven-
tion and peace-building inKosovo, but notwithout signiﬁcant shortcomings.59 To beginwith,
the very deployment of EULEX in 2008 was a success in itself. EULEX adopted ‘chameleon
pragmatism’ in order to overcome the issue of non-recognition of Kosovo by ﬁve member
states and meet the demand of Serbia to operate under a status neutral mandate.60 The
mission has demonstrated some successes on the establishment of a competent police and
custom service.61 EULEX has also contributed to the normalization of relations between
Kosovo and Serbia, providing an important ‘communication bridge’ between Pristina and
Belgrade.62 In addition, the mission has been involved in adjudicating a relatively high
number of cases.63 Nevertheless, few of them targeted or delivered verdicts in cases of
organized crime and high-proﬁle corruption and rule of law in Kosovo remains hampered.64
EULEXmeets contestation from both Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs.65 The status
neutral mandate is deeply problematic for Kosovo Albanians, who see this lack of acknowl-
edgement of Kosovo’s independence as undermining its sovereignty.66 Status neutrality,
however, is problematic for Kosovo Serbs too, who deem it to be merely declarative. This
view has been intensiﬁed by EULEX’s eﬀorts to bring the North under the control of
Pristina, violating, according to Kosovo Serbs, Serbia’s sovereignty.67 Moreover, Kosovo
Serbs criticize EULEX for failing to protect them against Kosovo Albanian attacks and
inadequately investigating such cases.68 Finally, both Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs
perceive EULEX as ineﬀective, due to the slow progress in establishing rule of law and
because of the widespread perception of corruption within EULEX.69
EULEX has exacerbated some features of Kosovo’s blended conﬂict. It intensiﬁed
external intervention in Kosovo’s domestic aﬀairs for the sake of regional stability,
deepening the perception among both Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs that they
are once again pawns of greater geopolitical interests. This perception is strengthened by
the failure to combat high-proﬁle corruption, which perpetuates the weakness of state
institutions. Also, the ineﬀectiveness of EULEX in prosecuting ethnic related crimes has
done little to ameliorate identity grievances.
Nevertheless, its shortcomings notwithstanding, the mission has probably done more
good than harm in managing Kosovo’s blended conﬂict.70 EULEX has successes in its
area of mandate, even if they are partial ones, supporting Kosovo’s institution-building
process. It facilitates the dialogue with Serbia and provides a tangible demonstration of
EU’s commitment in Kosovo. With the incentive of visa liberalization in the Schengen
area, and EU membership in the long term, the EU has the leverage to push for domestic
reforms in Kosovo.71 As a candidate country to join the EU, Serbia is also under pressure
from the EU to proceed to the necessary domestic reforms and also normalize its
relations with Kosovo. The settlement of the issue of Kosovo is a prerequisite for its
admission to the Union, as indicated in Chapter 35 of the accession process.72 Given also
the importance and the complexity of this matter, this Chapter is to be opened ﬁrst and
progress is required throughout and in parallel with progress in the other chapters.73
110 A. KARTSONAKI
Therefore, the settlement of the issue of Kosovo is of primary importance for Serbia, if it
wishes to continue with EU accession.
The EU-facilitated dialogue and the association of Serb majority
municipalities
For the normalization of relations between the two parties, the EU facilitated a high-level
dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, which resulted in April 2013 in the signing of the
Brussels Agreement.74 Its very signing by the Prime Ministers of Serbia and Kosovo
constituted an important practical and symbolic step towards normalization of relations.
Point 14 of the Brussels Agreement speciﬁed that ‘neither side will block, or encourage
others to block, the other side’s progress in their respective EU path.’75 Therefore, the
Agreement, although not being an oﬃcial international recognition by Belgrade, provides
the framework for the establishment of neighbouring de facto interstate relations
between Serbia and Kosovo.
The Brussels Agreement also demanded the dismantling of Serbian parallel structures,
speciﬁcally in policing and judiciary, paving the way for the overall removal of Serbia-run
institutions in Kosovo. The Agreement also stipulated the creation of the ‘Association/
Community of Serb Majority Municipalities in Kosovo.’76 The dual naming of
Association/Community runs throughout the agreement constituting an element of
constructive ambiguity, demonstrating the diﬀerent interpretations Serbian and
Kosovar sides had on the competencies of this institution.
The objective of the Association according to the Brussels Agreement and the General
Principles/Main Elements agreed in August 2015 is to exercise full overview to develop
local economy, education, health and social care for the municipalities in Kosovo, where
Serbs constitute a majority.77 The Association will also be able to coordinate urban and
rural planning, adopt measures to improve local living conditions for returnees to
Kosovo, conduct research and development activities. It will provide services and assess
the delivery of public services to its members and establish relations with other associa-
tions of municipalities, domestic and international.78
The fundamental function of the Association will be to promote the interests of the
Kosovo Serb community in its relations with the central authorities. For this purpose, it is
entitled to propose amendments to the legislation and other regulations and initiate or
participate in proceedings before the competent Courts, including the Constitutional
Court. It will also have the right to nominate representatives to the competent organs/bodies
of the central government.79 The Association will be funded from various sources, including
contributions from its members, income from companies or assets it owns, transfers from the
central authorities as well as ﬁnancial support from Serbia. Notably, the Association will be
exempt from duties and taxes. Finally, the Association will have a president, vice-president,
assembly and council as well as its own oﬃcial symbols (coat of arms and ﬂag).80
However, Serbia and Kosovo were not able to agree on the fundamental issue of the
powers of the Association. The Serbian government emphasizing the wording exercise full
overview in the document has strongly implied that the Association will have executive
powers within the central Kosovo structures.81 The Kosovo Government, on the other
hand, asserts that ‘all tasks and objectives of the Association are limited to the general
overview on local issues, without having the possibility of obtaining authorization in
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managing the local issues.’82 The Kosovo Government insists that the Association will merely
have a consulting character, similar to the existing Association of Kosovo Municipalities,
which is a non-proﬁt organization that represents general interests of its members.83
The vagueness around the competences of the Association facilitated the signing of the
agreement. Hence, the characterization of the unclear formulation as constructive ambi-
guity, as this was supposed to be the ﬁrst step towards a more concrete arrangement on
the functioning of the Association. This strategy had not produced the expected results,
though. The diﬀerent interpretations on the issue of powers have created an impasse that
has prevented the establishment of the Association, aggravating Kosovo’s latent blended
conﬂict.
Kosovo Serbs remain the most under-represented part in the process of settling the
issue of Kosovo. In spite of being most aﬀected by these negotiations, as they mainly deal
with the rights of Serbs in an independent Kosovo, Kosovo Serbs do not have a seat at the
negotiations table and talks are held between Belgrade and Pristina. For many Kosovo
Serbs, it remains unclear how the Association will practically add to the rights they have
already enjoyed. The provisions for the Association are not as far removed from the
Kosovan legal framework as presented by Kosovo Albanian and Serb politicians.
Education, health and social care, economic development and rural and urban planning
fall under the competences of municipalities and municipalities are allowed to cooperate
in these domains.84 The legal framework might not always be upheld in Kosovo.
However, through parallel structures, Serbia provided the resources for Kosovo Serbs
to manage such issues especially on education and health care.85 Now, with the
Association these competences – with or without executive powers – will be transferred
to the Kosovo system, which Kosovo Serbs consider to be lower in terms of quality than
the Serbian one, weakening, therefore, their access to public services.86
Not only that, but with the dismantling of Serbian structures, Kosovo Serbs, who are
employed by Serbia-run institutions may lose their income. Some of them will be
absorbed in the central Kosovo structures that will replace the Serbian ones. However,
the positions that the Kosovo government foresees for education, for example, are
signiﬁcantly less than the ones Serbia currently covers.87 This will inevitably lead to
rapid rise of unemployment among Kosovo Serbs and consequently their eventual
departure from Kosovo.88 Thus, for Kosovo Serbs, the Association will ‘take away what
[they] already had by weakening links with Serbia and putting into question the survival
of institutions sustaining the existence of Serbian community in Kosovo.’89 The
Association, therefore, will have an impact on certain aspects of Kosovo’s blended
conﬂict increasing poverty and frustration against weak institutions. It also increases
resentment against international involvement and policies designed in Brussels that
promote the EU agenda, but fail to address the needs of the local population.
Moreover, the predominant view among Kosovo Serbs is that the creation of the
Association is Serbia’s way out of Kosovo. They have realized that despite public
insistence on territorial integrity, Kosovo has diminished in importance for Serbia.90
Belgrade seeks to ﬁnally move away from the legacy of the Yugoslav wars and this is
achievable through normalization of relations with Pristina and EU integration.91 The
dismantling of Serbian structures and their handing over to Kosovo central authorities is
a part of this process. For Kosovo Serbs, therefore, the establishment of the Association
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under the central authorities in Pristina is a conﬁrmation of Serbia’s retreat from Kosovo,
adding to perceptions of abandonment and marginalization.
While for Kosovo Serbs the Association manifests the retreat of Serbia from Kosovo, for
Kosovo Albanians it demonstrates exactly the opposite. For them, the Association institu-
tionally establishes Belgrade’s involvement in Kosovo’s aﬀairs and undermines Kosovo’s
sovereignty. In return for the dismantling of the Serbian parallel structures and the
participation of Serbs in Kosovo’s elections, the Kosovo government has accepted the
creation of the Association.92 With that, however, they also accepted the legally sanctioned
direct interference of Belgrade in Kosovo’s local governance.93 Furthermore, Belgrade has
strengthened its interference in Kosovo’s domestic politics through Srpska Lista (Serbian
List), a political party created to represent the planned Association. Even though the
Association has yet to be established, the party has not only been formed, but in the 2017
elections, it won nine out of the 10 seats reserved for Kosovo Serbs. Srpska Lista is directly
controlled by the Serbian government and its members openly consult and co-ordinate
actions with Belgrade.94 For Kosovo Albanians, therefore, the Association undermines
Kosovo’s sovereignty as Belgrade oﬃcially acquires the right to interfere in Kosovo’s politics
through the right to ﬁnancially support the Association and heavily inﬂuence the choice of
its representatives through Srpska Lista.
The extended autonomy the Association might have, in combination with Belgrade’s
inﬂuence on it, intensiﬁed fears of ‘Bosnianisation’ of Kosovo.95 Bosnia-Herzegovina
being administratively divided along ethnic lines has created over the years a model of
a dysfunctional state.96 Kosovars fear that the Association will discourage Kosovo Serbs
from integrating into the Kosovan structures, with the Association evolving eventually
into an entity that resembles Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This not only will
further worsen Kosovo’s blended conﬂict by deepening ethnic segregation at the social
level, but will also undermine the capacities of the central state at the political level,
entrenching double sovereignty in Kosovo and severely obstructing the running of the
central state.97
Similar to Kosovo Serbs, Kosovo Albanians fail to see any added beneﬁt in establishing
the Association. Kosovo Albanians deem they have already made too many concessions
to Serbia and to the EU in terms of internal sovereignty in exchange for international
recognition.98 Frustration is exacerbated by previous compromises Kosovars made on
domestic laws and the rights of minorities, for example, the guaranteed seats minorities
have in the Assembly and state institutions99 and provisions that have been included in
the internal legislation after demand of the international actors100 and are considered by
Kosovo Albanians to be overgenerous.101 However, despite rhetoric of normalization of
relations, Serbia seems reluctant to grant Kosovo oﬃcial recognition and to open, thus,
the way to uncontested statehood. Kosovars, therefore, are frustrated and concerned that
they have been giving away elements of their sovereignty in vain.
The EU actions on Kosovo’s blended conﬂict have produced some positive results,
strengthening Kosovo’s institutions and providing incentives for Pristina and Belgrade to
comply with EU requisites. However, other aspects of Kosovo’s blended conﬂict have
been exacerbated. International involvement in Kosovo, frustration over its uncertain
status and the isolation it produces, the increasing involvement of Serbia in Kosovo’s
politics, without providing the much desired oﬃcial recognition, in combination with
economic stagnation, have created an alarmingly unstable situation in Kosovo. Kosovo’s
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political scene is plagued by recurring political crises. Kosovo citizens, Kosovo Albanians
and Kosovo Serbs alike, are tired of poverty, isolation and corruption. They have grown
weary of observing the coalition between former warlords and international adminis-
trators in order to maintain stability in the region.102 They are disappointed to witness
the violation of ‘western values’ on European soil and the turning of a blind eye to
corruption, discrimination and violation of human rights for the sake of stability.103
These mounting grievances are intensiﬁed by reforms negotiated in Brussels that are
neither welcome by all parties concerned, nor are they always planned to target the needs
of the local population. This creates a dangerous blend of potentially explosive factors,
where a latent conﬂict can turn into a violent one if the incentive of EU integration fades.
Conclusion
With the leverage of accession, the EU succeeded in bringing Kosovo and Serbia to high-
level de-facto interstate negotiations, which have led to remarkable results when con-
sidering the recent past of the actors involved. The very signing of the Brussels
Agreement and the subsequent technical negotiations were important steps towards
the resolution of the conﬂict. With the use of vague language and constructive ambiguity,
the EU has succeeded in maintaining engagement, avoiding at the same time to specify
thorny operational details.
Kosovo, however, is a blended conﬂict. It is plagued by identity grievances, horizontal
inequalities and internal divisions (ethnic and territorial). It is still a contested state that
incorporates a disputed territory within its borders. Not only is it resource rich, but it is
also located in a region of signiﬁcant geostrategic importance, being a potential member
of the EU, as well as a bridge between East and West. It is a place of global political
importance, where global powers have pursued their own agendas using Kosovo as
a stage to demonstrate their military, geopolitical and diplomatic capabilities.
Agreements, therefore, signed merely between Belgrade and Pristina, under the auspices
and pressure of Brussels are not enough to resolve the conﬂict sustainably. To the
contrary, piecemeal provisions and box-ticking exercises rather conceal problematic
issues, while slowly adding to existing grievances.
This article focused on the creation of the Association/Community of Serb-Majority
Municipalities, appraising its eﬀectiveness in managing Kosovo’s blended conﬂict. The
EU succeeded with constructive ambiguity around the Association to secure Serbia’s
retreat from the local level in Kosovo and at the same time to entrench its involvement at
the political level through the creation of Srpska Lista. Thus, Serbia is retreating from
Kosovo and the services it provides to Kosovo Serbs, but it maintains political leverage in
Kosovo’s domestic politics. This is a dangerous outcome that disappoints both Kosovo
Serbs and Kosovo Albanians: it deteriorates the living conditions of Kosovo Serbs, but it
also aggravates frustration of Kosovo Albanians over the still uncertain status of Kosovo
and the increasing involvement of Serbia in Kosovo’s politics. This creates an unstable
situation in a blended conﬂict, taking place in a contested state, located in an unstable
region, where neighbouring states are plagued by similar unresolved issues.
The EU seems to underestimate the complexity of the situation and the impact its
policies may have in the long term. These policies may serve the EU’s short-term goals for
as long as stability is maintained, which is understandable in light of the numerous
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institutional and ﬁnancial crises the EU has been confronting in the last years, as well as
the growing eurosceptisism in EU countries. Nevertheless, superﬁcial, box-ticking provi-
sions targeted to maintain political engagement rather than truly resolve problematic
issues may backﬁre in the future. Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians have become
increasingly weary of the EU carrot and stick policies that serve political and geopolitical
interests, without addressing their needs. Mounting frustration of both sides with the EU
and with their respective political elites creates an increasingly unsustainable situation in
Kosovo. It is high time that the EU prioritizes bottom-up implementable strategies that
tangibly improve the living conditions of local communities, rather than focusing on
grand political or technical agreements that remain on paper for years.
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